We test whether the sharp increase in sovereign spreads of euro area countries with respect to Germany after the explosion of the Greek crisis was due to deteriorating macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals or to some form of financial contagion. Our analysis includes indicators of domestic and external imbalances which were mostly disregarded by previous studies, and distinguishes between investors' increased attention to the variables which ultimately determine the creditworthiness of a sovereign borrower (wake-up-call contagion) and behaviour not linked to fundamentals (pure contagion). We find evidence of wake-up-call contagion but not of pure contagion.
Introduction

1
At the beginning of 2009, ten years after the launch of the euro, many commentators viewed the single currency as a major success. In the run-up to the euro's introduction, interest rates had rapidly converged towards the low levels of the most creditworthy member states: in the period 1992-1998, the average spread of long-term government bond yields with respect to the German one had declined from about 200 to 24 basis points. From 1999 onwards spreads continued to narrow, and at the end of 2007 they were negligible (16 basis points on average). Due to the …nancial turmoil triggered by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, some tensions started to surface in September 2008, but at the end of that year the average yield spread in the euro area was still about 100 basis points.
Strains on government securities markets became worrisome only towards the end of 2009 ( Figure   1 ). The focus of concern was Greece. After a series of upward de…cit revisions, the last of which equal to nearly 3 percentage points of GDP in October 2009, the Greek government estimated the de…cit at 12.7 per cent of GDP in 2009, up from 7.7 per cent in 2008. The tensions spilled over from Greece to the government securities of other euro-area countries, notably Ireland, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Italy. Three years after these events, some countries still are basically shut out of the bond market 2 and sovereign debt strains in the euro area remain worrisome and widespread, despite important progresses in …scal adjustment by national governments.
The debate concerning the causes of the European sovereign debt crisis in ‡ames both politics and academia. While some argue that …scal deterioration and fundamental macroeconomic weaknesses are at the root of the crisis, others claim that spreads are well above the levels justi…ed by fundamentals, and invoke forms of "market irrationality" and/or "contagion". The aim of the present paper is to assess the relative merits of these competing opinions through a formal econometric analysis.
Needless to say, the answer to this question has signi…cant policy implications. Evidence of sizable and systematic mispricing of sovereign credit risk would imply that it is ill-advised to rely on markets to induce …scal and macroeconomic discipine. Furthermore, it would strengthen the case for interventions by European Union institutions such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Central Bank (ECB) in the sovereign bond markets. In fact, the Eurogroup summit of 29 June 2012 decided to use the EFSF/ESM instruments in order to stabilize the markets of member states honouring all their European commitments on schedule. Soon afterwards, the ECB decided to undertake Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in the secondary markets for sovereign bonds in the euro area "to 1 The views expressed in the paper do not necessarily re ‡ect those of the Bank of Italy. We are indebted to Domenico Depalo, Michael Ehrmann, Carlo A. Favero, Eugenio Gaiotti, Giuseppe Grande, Marco Taboga, and participants in the Bank of Italy workshop "The sovereign debt crisis and the euro area", the 24th conference of the Italian public economics society (SIEP), and the Bocconi-CEPR conference on "Fiscal Policy and Growth" for valuable comments and suggestions. Corresponding author: Pietro Tommasino, email: pietro.tommasino@bancaditalia.it. 2 Greece applied for …nancial support in May 2010 , followed by Ireland (November 2010 and Portugal (April 2011).
5 address severe distortions which originate from, in particular, unfounded fears of the reversibility of the euro" (press conference following the meeting of the Governing Council on 6 September 2012).
While several other papers have studied the relationship between spreads and …scal fundamentals in European Monetary Union (EMU), ours contributes to the discussion in three ways. First, it considers a broader set of fundamentals. One lesson of the EMU crisis is that even countries with low levels of public debt and de…cits can su¤er a sudden deterioration of their …scal position, for example as an e¤ect of …nancial sector bailouts (which may transform private liabilities into public debt).
This risk was considered obvious for emerging markets at least since the Asian crisis of the late nineties, but it was not taken into account by the EMU rules and -as we show here -by investors.
Our second contribution to the literature is to distinguish between di¤erent forms of contagion and to measure their relative importance in explaining the post-crisis behaviour of European sovereign spreads. 3 Our third contribution is methodological: for the …rst time we apply to sovereign spreads panel methodologies designed to detect and tackle non-stationarity and cointegration.
To give a preview of our results, we …nd that the explosion of the Greek crisis had a systematic impact on the other euro area countries' sovereign spreads. However, this impact di¤ered across borrowers. In particular, investors penalized governments with weaker …scal and macroeconomic fundamentals more heavily .
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature and clarify our de…nition of contagion. In Section 3 we present our dataset and in Section 4 we discuss our empirical strategies and show our results. In Section 5 we discuss several robustness checks. In Section 6
we provide numerical estimates of the long-run values of the spreads, derived from our empirical analysis. Finally, in Section 6 we draw some tentative conclusions and policy implications.
Literature review
Several papers assess the determinants of sovereign spreads in EMU. Starting from Codogno et al. (2003) , the literature has expanded signi…cantly in the last few years (see, among others, Favero et al. (2010) , Beber et al. (2010) , Schuknecht et al. (2009 Schuknecht et al. ( , 2011 , Attinasi et al. (2009) , Sgherri and Zoli (2009) , Hallerberg and Wol¤ (2008) ). Typically, these studies explore the role of (a) countryspeci…c factors, namely …scal fundamentals and market liquidity, and (b) common factors, such as the market appetite for risk. In particular, they bring to the data an empirical model such as:
where Z it is a vector of country-speci…c variables and F t is a vector of variables that are common across countries. The above-mentioned papers di¤er from one another in terms of data frequency (from daily to yearly), the regressors included and estimation method (in particular, some adopt a pooled cross-section/time-series approach, others provide country-speci…c estimates). Of course, studies using high-frequency data, such as Favero et al. (2010) and Beber et al. (2010) , do not consider the role of …scal and macro fundamentals, which are available only at lower frequencies. Bernoth et al. (2012) consider a slightly di¤erent dependent variable (primary instead of secondary market spreads); their sample period ends in 2009, so it does not include the post-Greek-crisis period. Although their analysis focuses on the structural break due to the introduction of EMU in 1999, it also discusses the possible e¤ects of the Lehman bankrupcy in September 2008. Using an approach similar to ours, Bernoth et al. (2012) …nd that the Lehman bankrupcy increased the sensitivity of spreads to country-speci…c fundamentals and global factors.
Few papers consider instead the issue of contagion among sovereign securities within EMU.
Some papers simply augment equation (1) with a further Z it variable, which captures developments in all the other EMU countries di¤erent from i. In particular, Caceres et al. (2010) employ a measure of "distress dependence", which is built by extracting from the vector of CDS premia the unconditional marginal probability of default for each country. They then infer from those marginal distributions the joint probability of default, and build and add-up the default probability of country i conditional on the default of the other countries. Similarly, Hondroyiannis et al. (2012) add a "contagion variable", de…ned as a weighted combination of other countries'spreads. Neither Caceres et al. (2010) nor Hondroyiannis et al. (2012) consider the more recent years.
Our contribution borrows from a di¤erent strand of the literature, which discusses contagion concentrating on developing countries. In this literature, more precise and circumscribed de…nitions of contagion are used. 4 We follow, in particular, Eichengreen et al. (1996) , Masson (1998) and Goldstein et al. (2000) , who distinguish between three kinds of circumstances: 5
Wake-up-call contagion, a situation in which a crisis initially con…ned to one country provides new information that prompts investors to reassess the default risk of other countries (this concept is used, for example, by Goldstein, 1998 , Masson, 1999 , Goldstein et al., 2000 . In this case, domestic fundamentals justi…ed a ‡ight from sovereign debt even before the crisis event, but investors did not price/perceive the risk correctly. The wake-up-call hypothesis was …rst put forward by Goldstein (1998) to explain contagion from Thailand (a relatively small and closed economy) to other Asian countries in the Asian crisis of the late nineties.
He argues that the other countries were a¤ected by the same structural and institutional weaknesses as Thailand (crony capitalism, weak banking system, etc.), but investors ignored those weaknesses until the Thai "wake-up call". Such behaviour is also consistent with forms of "rational inattention" (Tutino, 2011, and Wiederholt, 2010) . According to rational inattention theory, given the existence of costs in aquiring and processing information, rational agents could optimally choose to ignore some information, for example concerning fundamentals.
Shift contagion, which occurs when the normal cross-market channel intensi…es after a crisis in one country. It can be seen as analogous to wake-up-call contagion except that it is due to increased sensitivity to common factors such as global risk aversion -the F t term in equation (1) -instead of country-speci…c factors. We borrow the term and the concept from the work of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) .
Pure contagion. This residual category covers any instance of contagion that is completely unrelated not only to changes in fundamentals (as in the case of wake-up-call and shift contagion) but also to the level of fundamentals, be they country-speci…c (as in the case of the wake-up-call contagion) or global (as in the case of shift-contagion). Pure contagion may arise from self-ful…lling (and therefore individually rational) loss of con…dence (Calvo, 1988) , from irrational herding behaviour (Chari and Kehoe, 2003) , or from margin calls and other wealth e¤ects for investors, triggered by capital losses in the country which originated the crisis (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002 , Kyle and Xiong, 2001 , Calvo and Mendoza, 2000 , Schinasi and Smith, 2000 .
In distinguishing between the three types of contagion, our contribution is similar to the paper by Bekaert et al. (2011) . They use an international asset pricing framework with global and local factors to predict equity returns, de…ning unexplained increases in factor loadings as indicative of contagion, and …nd evidence of systematic contagion whose severity is inversely related to the quality of countries'economic fundamentals and policies. They conclude that the wake-up-call hypothesis holds for equity markets, with markets and investors paying substantially more attention to countryspeci…c characteristics during the crisis.
We also see the approach pioneered by Gande and Parsley (2005) as very relevant and complementary to ours. They consider a sample of emerging countries and allow rating news concerning any one of them to in ‡uence the sovereign spreads in the others. In the present paper, we likewise consider a unidirectional version of their methodology, substituting our crisis dummy with a variable summarizing Greek rating developments. 6 Finally, let us remark that in our regressions, while taking into account the possibility that the situation of banks may have an impact on sovereign spreads, we focus on contagion across sovereign bond markets, leaving aside the issue of contagion from sovereign to other …nancial markets or to the banking sector (on this, see, among others, Acharya et al, 2011 , Alter and Schuler, 2011 , Angeloni and Wol¤, 2012 .
Data and descriptive statistics
Our dataset covers nine euro-area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands) using monthly data from January 2000 to December 2011. As is customary in the literature, we exclude Greece (the "ground-zero" country) from the analysis. 7 Our dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread with respect to the corresponding German Bund. 8 In our baseline speci…cation we consider as common factor -the F t variable in equation (1) -the VIX, the most common indicator of the propensity of investors to bear credit risk. 9 Data on government bond yields and on the other …nancial market variables are taken from Thomson Financial Reuters. These data are released daily, and we compute monthly averages of them.
Like our dependent variable, country-speci…c fundamentals -the Z it vector in equation (1) are in di¤erences with respect to the corresponding German variables. They include GDP growth and the ratios with respect to GDP of general government debt, private sector debt, de…ned as household plus non-…nancial corporation debt, and the current account surplus.
We also control for liquidity, measured by the di¤erence between the country's bid-ask spread on government bonds and the German one. 10 We do not control instead for di¤erences in debt characteristics such as in ‡ation-indexation and currency denomination. Indeed, unlike in emerging countries, in our sample public debt is mostly in nominal terms and denominated in euros. 11 The inclusion of private debt and the current account balance, while non-standard in the literature on advanced economies (an exception is Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012) , is frequent in studies concerning emerging countries and has strong economic rationale inasmuch as these are indicators of the domestic and external leverage of an economy. While a current account de…cit does not mean per se a higher sovereign vulnerability, it is often associated with competitiveness imbalances 7 We have veri…ed that our main results do not change if Greece is included in the regressions. We excluded Luxembourg, because for most of the sample period it essentially had no public debt. We had to exclude the remaining …ve countries because, as recent entrants to the euro, the pre-crisis period was clearly too short for us to estimate reliably our model (Estonia and Slovakia joined the union in respectively, Cyprus and Malta in 2008 , Slovenia in 2007 . Moreover, private debt data are missing for the late-accession countries. 8 An often-used alternative measure for the default risk is the credit default swap (CDS) premia. However, for our purposes it su¤ers from several shortcomings. First, a well-developed CDS market exists only for few countries in our sample, and even for those countries data are available only for the more recent years. Second, CDS premia are driven not only by credit risk considerations but also by counteparty risk. Third, during the crisis in some countries CDS markets were subject to policy interventions, such as short-selling bans, which are likely to have had an impact on CDS premia. 9 The VIX, the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, is a measure of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 stock index; it is considered a good indicator of the level of risk aversion in global capital markets.
1 0 This measure of liquidity is common in the literature (see, among others, Codogno, Favero and Missale, 2003, and Favero, Pagano and von Thadden, 2010) . Our variable is computed as the di¤erence between the minimum bid yield and the maximum ask yield observed at daily frequencies for benchmark bonds; this computational method implies limited variability over time of this di¤erence. Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2010) use instead the best …ve bid and ask prices. 1 1 As is well known this is not true of emerging economies (see e.g. the contributions in Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2004) . Concerning debt duration, in our sample we observe moderate cross-country di¤erences, but they are basically time-invariant and therefore mostly captured by the country …xed e¤ects. and problematic macroeconomic developments. Furthermore, external capital in ‡ows (the mirror image of the current account de…cit) may trigger a boom in the non-tradable sector (particularly the housing market), increasing the risk of a subsequent bust. 12 A similar line of reasoning can be applied to private sector debt: if households and …rms turn out to be unable to repay their debt, this might jeopardize public …nances, either because the government may bail them out directly or -as often happens -because it bails out the domestic banks that lent to households and …rms in the …rst place. In any case, in the presence of substantial private liabilities, public debt might increase signi…cantly and overnight. Notice that both variables are to be monitored at the European level under the new Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (European Commission, 2012) . 13 Fiscal and macroeconomic variables are taken from the Eurostat quarterly database. These data are generally released with a delay of one quarter. Our monthly series are obtained keeping the value of the variable constant in each month of the quarter. In our speci…cation we thus assume that spreads react simultaneously to liquidity and volatility factors and with a 3-month lag to …scal and macroeconomic variables. This also limits endogeneity problems and thus concerns about possible reverse causation between the current spread and the independent variables.
In Table 1 we report some descriptive statistics of the variables used in our benchmark speci…cation, distinguishing between two sub-periods (before and during the crisis). In the upper part of each panel we summarize the evolution of our dependent variable, i.e. the average yield spread, and the …nancial factors that in our speci…cation are assumed to in ‡uence it. In the bottom part we summarize the development of …scal and macroeconomic fundamentals. Statistics refer to all countries except Germany and Greece.
The spread between the government bond yields of these nine euro-area countries and the German one increased on average from 19 basis points in the period before the crisis to 175 basis points from October 2009 onwards. The increase was signi…cantly larger in the sub-group of peripheral countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain), from 25 to 330 basis points. Liquidity, measured by the bid-ask spread, worsened on average in the second part of our sample period (on average the spread increased from 1 to 6 basis points). The evolution of the VIX shows that global risk aversion increased during the euro-area sovereign crisis; however, as acute …nancial markets tensions had already emerged following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the di¤erence across sub-periods is not appreciable.
Turning to fundamentals, both …scal and macroeconomic conditions deteriorated signi…cantly during the sovereign debt crisis. Among domestic imbalances, the average general government debt increased by 17 percentage points of GDP (almost 30 in the peripheral countries); the increase in private debt was even larger (42 percentage points in the entire sample and 57 in the peripheral countries). GDP growth slowed on average from 1.8 to 1.1 per cent, re ‡ecting a negligible acceleration in the "virtuous" countries and a marked slow down in the others (from 2 to almost 0).
External positions also worsened: on average the current account de…cit increased from 0.5 to 0.7 per cent of GDP; with respect to Germany the deterioration was greater (about 2.5 percentage points of GDP), re ‡ecting strongly diverging competitiveness paths between Germany, on one side, and the other countries, on the other.
Empirical analysis
We use two alternative empirical models. The …rst (Section 4.1) is akin to equation (1), as it assumes that the spread is a stationary variable, even if it has an auto-regressive component. As stationarity is assumed by all the previous literature, we provide estimates of this model mainly for the sake of comparability. However, as we will argue below, there are good empirical reasons to question the stationarity hypothesis and also to conjecture the existence of a long-run cointegrating relationship between the spread and the other covariates (Section 4.2). Therefore, we will subsequently focus on the estimation of that long-run relationship (Section 4.3).
Stationary case
The empirical model. -We enrich the speci…cation in (1) in order to take into account the three di¤erent kinds of contagion e¤ects outlined in Section 2. We estimate the following model:
where the error term is assumed zero-mean, stationary and independent across countries (but we allow for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation), and D t is a dummy variable taking value one after the outbreak of the Greek crisis, which in our model coincides with the revision of the o¢ cial public …nance …gures by the new government in October 2009. Therefore, 0 captures "pure contagion", the vector of coe¢ cients 2 captures the wake-up-call e¤ect (a more pronounced post-crisis sensitivity to country-speci…c fundamentals), and 3 captures shift-contagion (an increased sensitivity to common factors).
Notice that in our speci…cation we allow for country-speci…c …xed e¤ects, to control for timeinvariant unobserved characteristics. Indeed, the previous literature has pointed to some very slowmoving features that in ‡uence a sovereign's creditworthiness, such as the political system (Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008) or debt intolerance (Qian et al. 2011) . We also allow for a change in the auto-correlation coe¢ cient in the post-crisis period ( 1 ).
Baseline results. -The Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimates of equation (2) shows that in the pre-crisis period the only statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients are those of GDP 11 growth and of the VIX: both a slowdown in GDP and a decrease in global risk appetite widen the spread ( Table 2 , column 1).
Instead, during the crisis the relationship becomes signi…cant for all the fundamental variables except private debt and the bid-ask spread. This suggests that a wake-up-call e¤ect exists for EMU countries. In particular, current account imbalances and public debt are not relevant in the precrisis period, whereas in the crisis period they become positively related to the sovereign spreads.
By contrast, neither "pure contagion"nor "shift-contagion"e¤ects are present (both 0 and 3 are insigni…cant). Finally, the estimated auto-correlation parameter is relatively high (with no change in the coe¢ cient after the Greek crisis), which points to possible non stationarity.
Considering only the peripheral countries. -The results could be di¤erent if one only considers peripheral euro area countries. First, it is more likely that investors'attention to these countries was already high before the crisis, given that their …scal reputation was already undeniably worse. This reduces the probability of observing wake-up-call contagion. Second, the probability of observing pure contagion should increase as investors possibly consider these countries more similar to Greece.
However, even when we restrict the sample to Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy, we …nd no pure contagion. The results are quite similar to the baseline estimation ( Table 2 , column 2). While Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy are conventionally considered the "periphery" of the euro area, the results are qualitatively unchanged when we include Belgium or both Belgium and France together in the periphery Bias-corrected estimates. -Since Nickell (1981) , it is well known that the LSDV estimator is biased when used in dynamic panels. While the fact that this bias decreases with the length of the panel should be reassuring, given our very long sample period, we also experimented with the Kiviet (1995) estimation technique, which appears to be particularly appropriate for macroeconomic (i.e. big T/small N) panels (Judson and Owen, 1999) . It turns out that the bias-corrected estimates are basically identical to our baseline. 14 
Testing for unit roots and cointegration
A legitimate issue with the econometric analysis presented in Section 4.1, given the observed high persistence of the spreads, is that they could actually be non-stationary. Indeed, performing common panel unit root tests such as those proposed by Levin Lin and Chu and by Pesaran, Im and Shin (see Banerjee, 1999 , Baltagi, 2008 , and Choi, 2006 , we could not reject the null of integration for the sovereign spreads (Table 3 , top panel). This result is robust even if we compute the relevant test statistics using di¤erent lag structures and di¤erent time spans. In particular, unit roots appear to be present not only if we look at the full sample, or at the post-crisis period, but also when we restrict the analysis to the pre-crisis period. 15 We also tested for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the spread and its determinants. In particular, we adopted the residual-based approach by Pedroni (see Banerjee, 1999, and Baltagi, 2008) . While the results are consistent with the existence of a cointegrating vector, they are not very clear-cut (Table 3 , bottom panel).
Non-stationary case
In this section we model the long-run relationship between spreads and fundamentals as:
therefore allowing for a structural change in the relationship in the post-crisis period, and for the di¤erent kinds of contagion e¤ects highlighted in the previous sections. As before, the error term is assumed independent across countries but possibly heteroskedastic and auto-correlated.
To estimate equation (3), we resort to di¤erent methods, in order to check the robustness of the results to di¤erent statistical assumptions.
First, we run a simple LSDV regression. Indeed, if spreads are I(1) and there is no cointegrating relationship between spreads and fundamentals, i.e., " it in equation (3) is I(1), the LSDV estimator delivers consistent estimates of the long-run average relationship between them, contrary to the pure time-series case (Phillips and Moon, 1999 , Phillips and Moon, 2000 ).
The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the stationary model, but much more pronounced and clear-cut (Table 2 , column 3). Before the crisis, all the fundamentals are signi…cant with economically meaningful signs, except GDP growth (which is not signi…cant) and the current account surplus (which has the wrong sign). After the start of the crisis, the e¤ect on the spread is magni…ed and with the expected sign for all the fundamentals. In particular, the e¤ect of GDP growth and of the current account surplus becomes signi…cant and negative, as it should be if markets correctly assess sovereign creditworthiness. Also, shift contagion (i.e. an increased post-crisis role of the VIX) emerges.
If spreads are I(1) but there exists a cointegrating relationship between spreads and fundamentals, i.e. " it in equation (3) is I(0), it can be shown that OLS estimates are inconsistent. We therefore estimate equation (3) using the panel dynamic least square (DOLS) estimator proposed by Kao and Chiang (2000) , which extends to panel data the approach of Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993) . That is, estimates of the coe¢ cients of interest are found by running the following OLS regression:
where the inclusion of Z it+j and F t+j among the regressors helps to get a consistent estimate of the s and the s. The results are remarkably similar to those of the previous exercise (Table 2, column 4).
As a …nal exercise, we consider a model with random, instead of …xed, individual e¤ects. As shown by Baltagi et al. (2008 Baltagi et al. ( , 2011 , to this end the best available option is to estimate equation (3) with feasible generalized least squares (notice that this holds irrespective of whether " it is I(0) or I (1)). The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the …xed-e¤ects speci…cation (Table 2 , column 5).
5 Robustness checks
Using di¤erent proxies
As a …rst robustness exercise, we consider two alternative measures of liquidity. One, used by Attinasi et al. (2009) , among others, is the country's share of the euro-area long-and medium-term sovereign bond issuance. The other is the monthly average of the traded volumes of the country's government securities with maturity between nine and eleven years relative to Germany's, used for example by Codogno et al. (2003) . In both cases, we found liquidity to be statistically insigni…cant, both alone and interacted with the crisis dummy.
As a second check, we experiment with a di¤erent proxy for global risk aversion and, following Codogno et al. (2003) and Bernoth et al. (2012) , we substitute the VIX with the yield spread between low-rated (BBA) US corporate bonds and the US Treasuries of corresponding maturity, without any notable e¤ect on the results.
Controlling for banking sector stress
As is commonly acknowledged, in several EMU countries worries about public debt sustainability were magni…ed by concerns about the state of the banking sector. While the role of banks in the EMU crisis is not the focus of this paper, it is important to control for this channel.
To do this, we …rst add to our baseline regressions a measure of domestic banks' credit risk, proxied by the CDS banking index, to account for the negative feedback e¤ects from the banking to the government sector. 16 Both in the stationary and in the non-stationary models, the absence of pure contagion and the presence of wake-up-call contagion are robust to the inclusion of the new variable. The latter is signi…cant and has the expected sign, except for the stationary speci…cation.
That is, an increase in the country's CDS banking index increases the country's sovereign spread as well. However, the e¤ect does not appear to have increased in the post-crisis period.
Alternatively, we introduced in our regressions, as a factor common to all countries (therefore included in the F t vector together with the VIX), the spread between the three-month euro interbank o¤ered rate (Euribor) and the corresponding OIS swap rate (which captures the market's expectations of the overnight funds rate). This di¤erence is considered a gauge of fears of bank insolvency (see e.g. Thornton, 2009 ). Contrary to country-speci…c CDS premia, this regressor becomes much stronger after the crisis, suggesting that the crisis gave rise to widespread concern about the health of the European banking system as a whole. In any case, even in these richer speci…cations we still …nd wake-up-call contagion, while we do not …nd pure contagion.
The de…nition of the contagious event
A possible pitfall of our analysis is that it relies on a sharp hypothesis concerning the start of the EMU sovereign crisis, although we do …nd that changing the moment of the structural break We address both problems by using, instead of our crisis dummy, a variable summarizing the Greek credit rating; we borrow this approach from Gande and Parsley (2005) and De Santis (2012) .
In particular, we transform the sovereign credit rating information (expressed in letters) of the three major credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's) into a numerical variable using a linear scale. The variable takes 22 values from 1 (triple-A) to 22 (selective default). We also take credit-watch changes into consideration: a negative credit watch increases the value of the variable by 0.5 while a positive credit watch corresponds to a decrease of 0.5. We use the average of the numerical indicators computed for the three main rating agencies.
The results are analogous to our baseline regressions (Table 4 , columns 1-4). In particular, the only fundamental variable which is statistically signi…cant when taken in isolation is GDP growth.
When interacted with the Greek rating variable, instead, government debt and the current account surplus also become signi…cant, as in the baseline regression. In particular, the analysis shows that a worsening of the situation in Greece magni…es the positive e¤ect of a current account surplus and the negative e¤ect of public debt on the spreads of the other EMU countries. Finally, as in our baseline model, the Greek …scal situation index, taken alone, has no e¤ect on other countries' spreads.
EU policy-makers at work
In the months following the crisis, EU authorities announced and implemented several crisismanagement interventions. While the e¤orts to improve the euro-area crisis management framework 15 have continued after the end of our sample period (see e.g. the ECB's OMT, announced in August 2012), during our sample period three major policy episodes can be singled out.
After several weeks of discussion, the turning-point in the EU authorities' approach to the Greek crisis came in the spring of 2010. On 2 May the euro-area countries agreed on a three-year …nancial support plan that provided bilateral loans to Greece. On 10 May, the EU Council established the EFSF, a vehicle empowered to issue securities guaranteed by euro-area countries and to provide loans to countries experiencing severe …nancial disturbance (loans are provided under conditions similar to those applied by the IMF). On the same day, the ECB launched the SMP, a programme of purchases of public and private debt securities issued in the euro area to support segments of the market especially hard hit by the crisis.
On 28 November 2010, the euro-area …nance ministers agreed to institute the ESM, a permanent crisis management tool, which is due to replace the EFSF, providing …nancial support to countries that request assistance subject to strict conditions. Assistance is also subject to a rigorous debt sustainability analysis. Member states considered insolvent would have to negotiate a restructuring plan with private creditors. On the same day, the …nance ministers also decided to grant support to Ireland through the EFSF.
On 21 July 2011, the Council agreed on a new Greek assistance programme, which included a sizable bail-in for private investors (with estimated losses amounting to e50 billion).
These policy actions may have in ‡uenced sovereign debt markets. To investigate this issue, we augment our empirical models with three event dummies, set equal to one in May 2010 (creation of the EFSF and launch of the SMP), December 2010 (creation of the ESM) and July 2011 (Greek private sector involvment), respectively. Introducing the event dummies does not change the economic and statistical signi…cance of the other coe¢ cients (Table 5 , columns 1-4). However, non-conventional actions of EU policy-makers had an impact. In particular, as expected, the actions taken in May 2010 eased the tensions on the sovereign debt markets, and the involvement of the private sector in the Greek debt restructuring increased spreads. The results concerning the announcement of the ESM are somewhat less obvious, as that policy dummy is either insigni…cant (Table 5 , columns 1 and 2) or signi…cant with a positive sign ( Table 5 , columns 3 and 4). This indicates that the replacement of the temporary EFSF with the permanent ESM did not calm the markets, possibly owing to the news that Ireland as well as Greece had lost market access and had to be bailed-out, or to the o¢ cial announcement that private sector involvement would be a permanent feature of the EU crisis resolution mechanism in the future.
A richer set of common factors
Ideally, one would like to control completely for unobserved time-varying common factors with a full set of time dummies. In practice, however, this would drastically reduce the degrees of freedom of our estimation. Moreover, the crisis dummy, which is the focus of our analysis, would be collinear with these dummies. 17 However, we can go some way in accounting for common time trends by enriching our vector of controls. In particular, we add to our F t vector two further variables: (1) the monetary policy rate set by the ECB (i.e. the interest rate on main re…nancing operations);
(2) an index of economic policy uncertainty for Europe computed recently by Baker et al. (2013) .
This second addition is quite interesting for its own sake. According to this index, economic policy uncertainty increased on average by 48% in the crisis period. We show that this richer speci…cation leaves our results una¤ected (Table 6 , columns 1-4). The two common factors appear signi…cant in some but not all of the models that we estimate. They display the expected signs: both a tightening of monetary policy and an increase in policy uncertainty tend to increase sovereign spreads.
Computing the long-run level of sovereign spreads
Equation (3) can be rewritten applying the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to the crisis-induced change in spreads, as in Eichengreen and Mody (2000) . That is, the di¤erence between the precrisis and the crisis spread can be decomposed into two parts: one due to a change in the regressors, the other due to a change in the coe¢ cients. The change in the constant term is what we identify as the "pure" contagion e¤ect. Conditional on the occurrence of the crisis, one gets:
where the LR superscripts serve as a reminder that we are considering here the long-run equilibrium values of the spread. Therefore, the post-crisis long-run value of the spread is equal to:
Terms in the second row capture the post-crisis change in fundamentals, while terms in the third row capture the di¤erent kinds of contagion: 0 is what we call pure contagion and is unrelated to country characteristics; 2 E(Z it jD it = 1) captures wake-up-call contagion, is country-speci…c and depends on fundamentals; 3 E(F t jD it = 1) is the shift-contagion component.
We use the estimates presented in Section 4.3 to compute the various pieces of equation (5).
We …rst consider, for each country, the estimated value of E[s LR it jD t = 0] ( Table 7 , column 1). We then add to this value the terms in the second line of equation (5) (Table 7 , column 2). To compute those values it is necessary to assess the pre-and post-crisis values of the fundamentals and of the VIX. In the table, we put them equal to their respective sample counterparts. Finally, we add the contagion terms, and we get to E[s LR it jD t = 1] ( Table 7 , column 3). According to our calculations, for most countries the spreads observed at the end of the sample period (December 2011) are very close to their estimated long-run levels. However, for two countries, namely Spain and Italy, they are considerably above their equilibrium values (Figure 2 ).
Conclusions and policy implications
The analyses presented in this paper suggest that investors largely ignored macroeconomic indicators when pricing sovereign bonds before October 2009. At that date they started to discriminate among sovereigns based on the quality of their fundamentals. In particular, countries with worse …scal conditions and external positions recorded higher spread levels. In the terminology adopted in this paper, the sharp increase in spreads observed for some countries after the start of the Greek crisis was the result of a wake-up-call rather than of a pure form of contagion: the Greek crisis increased investors'sensitivity to the fundamentals of the other euro-area countries.
Concerning the policy implications of our results, the fact that for some countries the current spread levels are above their long-run values argues for policy measures to speed up the convergence of spreads towards their long-run levels. It must be stressed that the absence of pure contagion, per se, does not settle the normative issue concerning the investors'ability to price sovereign bonds correctly. 18 We cannot say, for example, whether the increased post-crisis sensitivity to fundamentals is "appropriate": it could also be "too limited" or "excessive". Answering this question would be important in implementing the OMT. More broadly, it would help settle the debate about the relative merits of market-based as against rules-based …scal and macroeconomic discipline, which is as old as the very idea of EMU. Indeed, already in 1989 the Delors report worried that market forces "might be either too slow and weak or too sudden and disruptive". Further research on this issue, both theoretical and empirical, is warranted. Another related question is the possible reoccurence of a regime in which investors do not pay attention to fundamentals. To avoid disruptive cycles of excessive complacency and sudden wakeup calls, it seems advisable to push for market-friendly policies that highlight the fundamental imbalances of EMU countries even in good times. This is the rationale behind the decision to periodically publish scoreboards prepared by the European Commission and the results of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. Needless to say, the variables included and the methodology 1 8 Symmetrically, the existence of contagion does not imply malfunctioning of the markets. This is particularly true in the case of wake-up-call and shift contagion. For example, rational inattention stories would imply that markets are constrained-e¢ cient, once the limits in information processing are taken into account. It appears more di¢ cult, but not impossible, to reconcile "pure" contagion with market e¢ ciency and/or with full rationality (Kyle and Xiong, 2001, Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). 18 adopted in such exercises should be based on sound economic principles. 19 Nov-09 Jan-10 Mar-10 May-10 Jul-10 Sep-10 Nov-10 Jan-11 
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